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THE COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE IN EUROPE  
 
Hector L MacQueen
*
 
 
Abstract  
This paper considers the genesis, content and prospects of 
the Common Frame of Reference project in the European 
Union, and reflects on the value and significance it may 
have outside Europe, with particular reference to Africa.  
The CFR is also assessed from the perspective of Scots law. 
 
A dozen years ago, as a relatively fresh-faced member of 
the Lando Commission on European Contract Law (CECL), I 
wrote a paper pointing out that the rules emerging in the 
Commission's text, the Principles of European Contract Law 
(PECL), appeared to be a mix of Civil Law and Common Law 
elements that to a considerable degree matched the position 
of the mixed system of Scots contract law – and indeed the 
position in South Africa.
1
  A couple of years later the 
                                                 
*
 Professor of Private Law, University of Edinburgh; 
Scottish Law Commissioner.  The views expressed in this 
paper do not represent those of the Scottish Law 
Commission.  The paper was first presented on 14 May 2009 
at the colloquium on “Mixed Jurisdictions as Models? 
Perspectives from Southern Africa and Beyond”, jointly 
hosted by the International Academy for Legal Science and 
World Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists at Stellenbosch 
University.  The paper has been lightly revised but I have 
left it in the relatively informal register of a conference 
presentation. I am grateful to Eric Clive and the 
colloquium participants for much helpful comment and 
discussion.   
1
 Hector L MacQueen, Scots Law and the Road to the New Ius 
Commune, Ius Commune Lectures on European Private Law No 1, 
Universities of Maastricht, Utrecht, Leuven and Amsterdam 
in co-operation with the Free University of Amsterdam and 
the University of Liege (Maastricht: 2000). For PECL, see 
 2 
point was picked up for South Africa and considerably 
elaborated by my fellow-Lando Commissioner, Reinhard 
Zimmermann, in his Clarendon Lectures delivered at Oxford 
in 1999.
2
  We both saw mixed legal systems as potential 
sources of inspiration for the Europeanisation, not only of 
contract law, but also of other aspects of law, such as 
unjustified enrichment and trusts.  The mixed systems were 
models of how European private law might develop in a 
Europe drawing closer together in the framework of the ever 
closer union of countries and jurisdictions now known as 
the European Union.  It was a theme that others were 
simultaneously taking further, notably Jan Smits from the 
Netherlands, and I think played its part in the greater 
interest that study of mixed systems has since attracted.
3
  
 
In 2006 Zimmermann and I together edited a collection 
with a triangular and critical comparison of PECL with 
Scots and South African contract law.
4
  The project was 
conceived as a development of the earlier discussion about 
mixed systems as models for European private law.  But it 
                                                                                                                                                 
generally Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds), Principles of 
European Contract Law Parts I and II (The Hague, Kluwer: 
2000); Ole Lando, Eric Clive, André Prüm and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), Principles of European Contract Law Part 
III (The Hague, Kluwer: 2003) 
2
 Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European 
Law: The Civilian Tradition Today, Clarendon Law Lectures 
1999 (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2000), 126-158.  
3
 See e.g. Jan Smits (ed), The Contribution of Mixed Legal 
Systems to European Private Law (Antwerp and Groningen, 
2001); Jan Smits (trans N Kornet), The Making of European 
Private Law: Towards a Ius Commune Europaeum as a Mixed 
Legal System (Antwerp, Oxford and New York, 2002).  
4
 Hector MacQueen and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), European 
Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh: 2006).  
 3 
quickly became clear to us that the context of the 
discussion had changed, and with it so should the form of 
our book.   
 
In the latter stages of the PECL project it had become 
obvious that the work was going beyond contract law and 
into the general law of obligations, including points such 
as assignment, where obligations began to intersect with 
property.  In 1998 many members of the Commission 
(including myself, but not Zimmermann) were involved in 
setting up a Study Group on a European Civil Code.  
Basically this used the CECL methods across a much wider 
range of private law subjects.
5
  PECL itself was completed 
and fully published by 2003,
6
 and became the basis for the 
Study Group’s work on specific contracts and other non-
contract topics.   
 
Whether or not coincidentally, the European Commission 
shortly afterwards began public consultation on a project 
which has become known as the Common Frame of Reference 
(CFR).
7
  In simple terms, the argument was this.  The 
European Union is fundamentally about the creation of a 
single market in Europe, in which the movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is unimpeded by the borders 
of its Member States.  To that end the European Union has 
always engaged in law-making activities, either imposing 
                                                 
5
 For the Study Group on a European Civil Code, and its 
publication series Principles of European Law, see 
http://www.sgecc.net/.  Seven volumes of the Principles of 
European Law have so far appeared. 
6
 See above, note 1, for details of the publication of PECL. 
7
 For a brief account of the background see MacQueen and 
Zimmermann, European Contract Law (above, note 4), preface, 
viii-x.  
 4 
Europe-wide regulation on a range of matters (e.g. 
competition law or many aspects of intellectual property), 
or directing the Member States to harmonise their different 
laws on particular topics so as to ensure consistency of 
result across the market – that is to say, aiming to 
prevent national laws becoming means, conscious or 
otherwise, of dividing the market.   
 
To take an example of the latter of importance for 
this paper, consumers should not have variable rights 
according to where they happen to be domiciled or active 
within the European Union.  Yet the European interventions 
were not themselves consistent or mutually coherent, and 
they not infrequently used language or concepts the legal 
import of which might be readily understood in some 
jurisdictions while being completely opaque on others – 
good faith being the classic example amongst many.
8
  Indeed, 
it was not always clear that the most basic of ideas, such 
as that of contract itself, were understood in the same way 
throughout the Union. 
 
So the CFR emerged initially as a “toolbox” of 
principles, concepts and terminology which would be 
commonly understood across the European Union, and which 
would be used consistently in future legislation as well as 
in revising and improving the existing texts (the acquis 
communautaire).  Model rules would thus form part of the 
package.  All this would be based on the acquis but also 
                                                 
8
 See Christian von Bar and Eric Clive (eds), Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), 6 volumes (Sellier, 
Munich: 2009), vol 1, introduction, para 59.  
 5 
make use of the comparative work that had already gone into 
the making of PECL.  The net would however be cast wider 
than general contract law, since the acquis dealt piecemeal 
with many specific contracts, product liability, aspects of 
property and securities law, and even in some respects 
unjustified enrichment.  In any event, contract law could 
not be considered in isolation from other parts of private 
law.  While the Commission was careful not to dub its 
brainchild the European civil code that the European 
Parliament had called for many times since 1989, and 
emphasised that there was no question of supplanting 
national laws, it did raise the possibility of what it 
called an “optional instrument” that might be a legal basis 
to which, for example, parties to cross-border transactions 
might choose to subject themselves as opposed to making a 
choice of national laws.   
 
The Commission then did what its name suggests it 
does: in 2005 it commissioned the Study Group and another 
group called the Research Group on Existing EC Private Law 
(the Acquis Group), which was working critically on the 
coherence and structure of existing European legislation, 
to produce jointly a Draft Common Frame of Reference (the 
DCFR), with Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law.
9
  The commission’s content owed 
everything to the work that was already far advanced in 
both Groups; and this explains why it has been possible to 
do the work in not much more than three years, the text of 
the DCFR having been published in February 2009.
10
  This was 
                                                 
9
 Ibid, para 2.  
10
 Christian von Bar and Eric Clive (eds), Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft 
 6 
however but an “outline edition”; the full DCFR, with 
detailed commentary and comparative annotations, appeared 
in six thick volumes in October 2009.
11
   
 
All this meant that the MacQueen/Zimmermann volume 
could no longer simply discuss the extent to which the 
mixed systems of Scotland and South Africa had anticipated 
PECL.  Instead we had to engage critically with PECL as an 
instrument which might become a basis for some sort of 
European model law, using our laws as the springboards for 
our criticisms and in turn reviewing those laws in the 
light of PECL.  I think the resulting studies have 
certainly contributed to the revision of the PECL texts now 
incorporated in the DCFR.  It should not be altogether 
surprising to find Eric Clive’s chapter on interpretation 
voicing criticisms of PECL’s provisions which have been 
largely picked up in the DCFR, since Clive has been one of 
the leading figures in the editing and construction of the 
latter.
12
  But there are other examples.  Gerhard Lubbe’s 
brilliant analysis of assignment has had influence in the 
re-casting of that topic in DCFR Book III Chapter 5 Section 
1.
13
  My own chapter on good faith was a contribution to a 
debate the result of which has been a downplaying of, or 
perhaps greater specificity about, the role the concept 
                                                                                                                                                 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Final Outline Edition 
(Sellier, Munich: 2009).  
11
 See above, note 8.  
12
 Eric Clive, "Interpretation" in MacQueen and Zimmermann, 
European Contract Law (above, note 4), 176-202; DCFR Book 
II Chapter 8.  
13
 Gerhard Lubbe, "Assigment", in MacQueen and Zimmermann, 
European Contract Law (above, note 4), 307-330; DCFR Book 
III, Chapter 5 Section 1.  
 7 
plays in the regulation of contractual freedom in the DCFR 
than was apparent in PECL.
14
   
 
However, most of the chapters, including the ones 
already mentioned, also used PECL as a basis for 
criticising Scots and South African law.  One of the 
implicit general conclusions of the book was, I would say, 
that at least from a doctrinal point of view PECL 
represented an advance on both systems, and that it was 
sufficiently akin to what already existed in them that it, 
or perhaps a modified version, could advantageously and 
without major dislocation be adopted by law reformers in 
both jurisdictions.  While this reflected the fact that 
PECL was obviously itself a mixed system, that was not the 
decisive factor for our contributors.  What mattered was 
that the PECL rules lived up to the claim to be at least 
better – or perhaps more complete - than those currently 
found in Scotland and South Africa.
15
   
 
Possibly too this was because Scots and South African 
contract laws are uncodified, meaning that with their 
dependence on judicial precedent there are inevitably gaps 
                                                 
14
 Hector MacQueen, "Good faith", in MacQueen and 
Zimmermann, European Contract Law (above, note 4), 43-73; 
DCFR I.-1:102(3); III.-1:103.  
15
 As Christian von Bar and Eric Clive made clear at the 
Second World Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists in 
Edinburgh in June 2007, however, the claim of the DFCR to 
attention also does not depend upon its being a “mixed” 
system (whether or not that is the case being really 
irrelevant to the future uses of the project).  All the 
same, it may be easier for a mixed system to adjust and 
adapt to the contents of the DCFR than it is for ones such 
as England and France, which view themselves as exemplars 
of a particular and distinctive form, style and substance 
of law. 
 8 
and uncertainties in the law which can only be partially 
filled by legal literature.  It is significant, I think, 
that Scottish texts on contract law published since the 
emergence of PECL have found it helpful to cite PECL, not 
only to fill gaps, but also to indicate structure, define 
concepts, and provide comparative guidance.
16
  In this they 
were following a lead given by the Scottish Law Commission 
in the late 1990s, when in considering reform of the law on 
interpretation, breach of contract and penalty clauses the 
Commission referred to the models provided not only by PECL 
but also by the parallel UNIDROIT instrument, the 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC).
17
  
 
It seems certain to me that, whatever happens to it in 
the political arena of the European Union, the DCFR will 
now play a role similar to that which has hitherto been 
played by PECL, but across a much wider range of law.  
Indeed the Scottish Law Commission, currently preparing its 
Eighth Programme of Law Reform to run from 2010-2014, has 
consulted on whether this should include “a Scottish 
contract code, based on the European draft Common Frame of 
Reference”.18  A letter sent to stakeholders by the 
Commission during the process of consultation also 
                                                 
16
 Hector L MacQueen and Joe Thomson, Contract Law in 
Scotland (1st edn, 2000; 2nd edn, 2007); W W McBryde, The 
Law of Contract in Scotland (1st edn, 2001; 2nd edn, 2007).  
17
 UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts 2004 (International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Rome: 2004).  
18
 See the Scottish Law Commission's website, 
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/html/eighth_programme.php 
(last checked December 8, 2009).  
 9 
mentioned the narrower topic of formation of contracts;
19
 a 
project on this subject would be bound to consider the PECL 
rules as now embodied in the DCFR.  Given that the 
Commission’s reports of a decade and more ago on formation, 
interpretation, breach of contract and penalty clauses 
remain unimplemented, there seems much to be said for the 
wider approach.
20
  Amongst its current topics expected by 
the Commission to carry over into the new programme are 
aspects of assignation, trusts, and consumer remedies; on 
all of these the DCFR has something to say, and a great 
deal more than something usually.
21
  Should the DCFR, or 
some part of it, be adopted by the European Commission as 
its own legislative toolbox, it will be imperative for 
national law reform also to be aware of it in ensuring 
that, as far as needful and possible, national laws do not 
fall seriously out of step with the rest of Europe.  
 
At the same time, and especially if the DCFR takes on 
some life in positive law at a European level, it will be 
vitally important that the document itself be critically 
analysed and, over time, developed and kept up-to-date.
22
  A 
                                                 
19
 A copy of this letter, dated 6 February 2009, is in the 
possession of the author. 
20
 Report on Formation of Contract: Scottish Law and the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Scot Law Com No 144, 1993); 
Report on Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com No 
160, 1997); Report on Penalty Clauses (Scot Law Com No 171, 
1999); Report on Remedies for Breach of Contract (Scot Law 
Com No 174, 1999). 
21
 DCFR Book III, Chapter 5 Section 1 (assignment); Book X 
(trusts); Book III Chapter 3 (remedies).  
22
 For some early critical comment see e.g. Horst 
Eidenmüller, Florian Faust, Hans Christopg Grigoleit, Nils 
Jansen, Gerhard Wagner, and Reinhard Zimmermann, "The 
Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law-Policy 
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European Law Commission has been mentioned as a 
possibility,
23
 and I myself have been involved in 
discussions about continuing the DCFR work as an academic 
project, perhaps through a European Law Institute focused 
on private law.
24
  Development might include going into 
areas not yet covered, such as property (including land), 
the family, wills and succession.  Keeping up-to-date would 
be a matter, not only of monitoring implementation and 
effects but also of following legal practice, which is 
usually far ahead of academic concepts – a point to which 
DCFR research frequently found itself referring.  But it 
would also be a case of picking up questions that have 
arisen in particular national laws but to which the DCFR 
provides no answer or guidance, or at least nothing obvious 
on its face. 
 
An example of this latter kind of issue is, I think, 
what is known in England as restitutionary or gain-based 
                                                                                                                                                 
Choices and Codification Problems", Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 28 (2008) 659-708; Antoni Vaquer, "Farewell to 
Windscheid? Legal Concepts Present and Absent from the 
Draft CFR" accessible at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372139 
(April 2, 2009); Martijn W Hesselink, "The Common Frame of 
Reference as a Source of European Private Law", Tulane Law 
Review 83 (2009) 919-971. 
23
 Evidence of Mr Jonathan Faull, Director General, Justice, 
Freedom and Security, European Commission, to the House of 
Lords European Union Committee, March 25, 2009, Q 153, 
accessible at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/
ldeucom/95/9032503.htm (last checked December 8, 2009).  
24
 See the European Private Law News blog, Edinburgh Law 
School (http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/epln/) entries for May 6, 
2009 ("European Legal Research Association: Prague 
meeting") and November 4, 2009 ("Towards a European Law 
Institute").  
 11 
damages for breach of contract.  For those to whom this 
concept is unfamiliar, the idea is that instead of damages 
being based on the loss suffered by the innocent party they 
are measured by the gain (or saving, as the case may be), 
made by the contract-breaker through the breach.  The best-
known example in England is Attorney General v Blake,
25
 
where an erstwhile spy broke his lifelong contractual duty 
to the United Kingdom by publishing his memoirs: the House 
of Lords held that the UK government could recover the 
royalties which this publication earned as damages for the 
spy’s breach of contract.  Another case in which 
commentators have suggested a gains-based approach to 
damages might have been used is Ruxley Electronics and 
Construction Ltd v Forsyth,
26
 where a builder constructed a 
swimming-pool for a client but to a depth considerably less 
than provided for in the contract, thereby saving 
significant expenditure on the work.  In both examples the 
loss of the innocent party is difficult or impossible to 
quantify; if breach of contract is to be appropriately 
deterred, stripping the contract-breaker of its gains from 
the breach thus seems the only effective approach. 
 
                                                 
25
 [2001] 1 AC 268.  
26
 [1996] AC 344, as discussed e.g. in Janet O’Sullivan, 
"Loss and gain at greater depth: the implication of the 
ruxley decision", in F Rose (ed) Failure of Contracts: 
Contractual, Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford: 1997), 1-25.  The claimant in 
fact recovered damages based on loss of amenity resulting 
from an inability to dive into the pool, a much larger 
claim for the cost of curing the non-performance having 
been refused as unreasonable given that the difference in 
value between the pool as it was and as it should have been 
was nil.  
 12 
The court in Blake made clear that a gain-based remedy 
for breach of contract was to be regarded as for use only 
in exceptional cases, without indicating with any precision 
or detail what the circumstances justifying the exceptional 
remedy might be.  The English courts have not approached 
the precedent of Blake in an expansive fashion.  The few 
successful subsequent claims have generally involved 
deliberate breaches of contract aimed squarely at gain or 
the avoidance of loss.
27
  Professor Burrows suggests that at 
least two factors must be present to justify a Blake-type 
award: (1) cynical breach, deliberately calculated to make 
gains; (2) the inadequacy of normal compensatory damages in 
that these will not put the claimant in as good a position 
as if the contract had been performed.
28
  Others have seen 
the remedy as a "monetised form of specific performance",
29
 
and argued, against the background that specific 
performance is not a generally available remedy for breach 
of contract in English law, that similar limitations may 
apply to gain-based recovery.  In Blake, the leading 
speech, by Lord Nicholls, refers to "whether the [claimant] 
has a legitimate interest in preventing the defendant's 
profit-making activity and, hence, in depriving him of the 
                                                 
27
 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Niad [2001] All ER (D) 324 (Nov); 
Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EMLR 25 
(CA).  Unsuccessful claims include AB Corporation v CD 
Company, The Sine Nomine [2002] 1 Lloyds Rep 805; World 
Wide Fund for Nature (formerly World Wildlife Fund) v World 
Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc [2002] FSR 32, aff'd 
[2002] FSR 33 (CA).   
28
 Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of 
Contract, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2004), 
406-407.  
29
 Jack Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1991), 17. 
 13 
profit."
30
  Dr Edelman sees this requirement of a legitimate 
interest in performance as the genuinely distinctive 
characteristic of gain-based remedies in breach of contract 
cases.
31
 
 
Commentators from the Common Law tradition have argued 
that the term "restitutionary damages" is inapt for generic 
use in cases of gain-based recovery for breach of contract.  
They propose that the phrase be restricted to those cases 
where the gain recovered is one that has been directly 
conferred upon the contract-breaker by the other party to 
the contract, while the recovery in cases like Blake and 
Ruxley should be described as "disgorgement damages", since 
there the gain has not involved any direct diminution of 
the other party's patrimony.
32
  Others have further 
distinguished between two different measures of gain-based 
damages in such disgorgement cases.
33
  The award in cases 
like Blake is said to be "subjective", based on the actual 
gain made by the contract-breaker.  But there are other 
cases where a more "objective" measure is applied.  The 
                                                 
30
 [2001] 1 AC 268 at 285.   
31
 Jamie Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity 
and Intellectual Property (Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon; 2002), 189.  
32
 Edelman, Gain-Based Damages (above, note 31) 66-93.  Cf 
Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 2nd edn 
(Butterworths LexisNexis, London and Edinburgh: 2002), 461-
462; Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd edn (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 2005), 282.  
33
 See especially two papers by Ralph Cunnington: (1) "The 
measure and availability of gain-based damages for breach 
of contract", in D Saidov and R Cunnington (eds), Contract 
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon; 2008) 207-242; (2) 
"The assessment of gain-based damages for breach of 
contract" Modern Law Review 71(4) (2008) 559-586.  
 14 
classic example is provided by the decision of Brightman J 
in Wrotham Park v Parkside Homes.
34
  In this case, a housing 
developer broke the contract under which it had bought some 
land by building upon it more houses than permitted by the 
sale agreement.  Damages were awarded on a "hypothetical 
bargain" approach, meaning that the developers were 
required to pay a sum of money such as they might 
reasonably have had to pay to get the seller to relax the 
covenant.  This was although the judge found as a fact that 
the seller would never have entered any bargain of the kind 
– hence the "objectivity" of the award.  But what the 
seller recovered can be seen as representing the 
developer's gain since the sum was calculated as a royalty 
of its profits from the development.
35
  
 
Now recovery of this kind as damages is not at all 
familiar in the contract laws of other jurisdictions in 
Europe, and it is also currently rejected – or at least not 
known - in most of the leading mixed jurisdictions such as 
Scotland, Louisiana and South Africa.  The exception to 
                                                 
34
 [1974] 1 WLR 798.  
35
 There is a substantial debate on whether Wrotham Park 
damages should be seen, not as gain-based, but as 
compensatory (i.e. based on a notional loss to the seller).  
This is how the remedy was seen by the Court of Appeal in 
World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wide Wrestling 
Federation [2007] EWCA Civ 286; but cf Craig Rotherham, 
“‘Wrotham Park damages’ and accounts of profits: 
compensation or restitution”, Lloyds Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly [2008] 25; Andrew Burrows, "Are 
'damages on the Wrotham Park basis' compensatory, 
restitutionary or neither?", in Saidov and Cunnington 
(above, note 33), 165-185; Francesco Giglio, The 
Foundations of Restitution for Wrongs (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon; 2007), 83-92, 213;  Edelman, 
Gain-based Damages (above, note 31), 101, 179-181.   
 15 
this rule amongst mixed jurisdictions is Israel, where it 
was held in the Adras case that a seller of goods who in 
breach of a commercial contract with the first buyer re-
sold them to a second buyer willing to pay a higher price 
for them was liable in damages to the first buyer for the 
gain made from the second transaction.
36
  The question 
appears never to have been addressed by a court in South 
Africa,
37
 but in both Scotland and Louisiana relatively old 
judicial authority is clearly against this kind of claim.
38
 
The Louisiana case provides a particularly nice example of 
a gain being made through under-performance of a contract.  
The city of New Orleans contracted with the association for 
the provision of fire services over a period of several 
years.  After the contract expired, the city discovered 
that the association had not maintained resources at the 
level needed to provide the services contracted for in the 
event of fire, and sued for damages for non-performance.  
It was held that as the city had suffered no loss, no 
substantial damages were recoverable.  The association 
might have been enriched by savings of over $40,000, but 
such gains by the contract-breaker were irrelevant to its 
liability for breach of contract.  It has however been 
                                                 
36
 Adras Building Material Ltd v Harlow and Jones GmbH 
(1988) 42(1) PD 221 (fully translated in Restitution Law 
Review 3 (1995) 235).  
37
 See Daniel Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (Juta & Co, 
Cape Town; 2008) 692-698.  
38
 Teacher v Calder (1899) 1 F (HL) 39; City of New Orleans 
v Fireman’s Charitable Association 9 So 486 (1891). See 
further John Blackie and Iain Farlam, "Enrichment by the 
act of the party enriched", in Reinhard Zimmermann, Daniel 
Visser and Kenneth Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in 
Scotland and South Africa (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
2004), 493-494.  
 16 
suggested that Article 2018 of the Louisiana Civil Code 
might now allow a gains-based award in such cases of breach 
of contract; but achieving this result requires fairly 
elaborate interpretation of Article 2018 alongside other 
parts of the Code, and the scope for recovery would 
certainly be limited, if it exists at all.
39
   
 
Outside England, therefore, the principle that damages 
for breach of contract are about compensation for loss has 
generally stood firm.  A gain-based approach has, however, 
some very obvious attractions as a remedial response to 
breach of contract.  By taking away the incentive to 
breach, it helps keep parties to their bargains, and 
promotes good faith.  There could be a link with the remedy 
of specific implement or performance: for example, that the 
debtor’s gain arose from use of an asset s/he could have 
been specifically ordered to deliver or perform prior to 
the gain-creating use.  It is also consistent with ideas of 
unjustified enrichment, however, inasmuch as the 
disgorgement of gains made through the use of another’s 
assets – in this case, the innocent party’s entitlement to 
the other’s contractual performance – is a familiar aspect 
of the law in that area across Europe.
40
  This is a point to 
which we will return below.  
                                                 
39
 See Hector L MacQueen, "Unjustified enrichment, 
subsidiarity and contract", in Elspeth Reid and Vernon 
Palmer (eds), Mixed Jurisdictions Compared: Private Law in 
Louisiana and Scotland (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh: 2009), 322-354 at 336.  
40
 Peter Schlechtriem, Christoph Coen and Reiner Hornung, 
“Restitution and unjust enrichment in Europe”, European 
Review of Private Law 9 (2001) 377-415, at 382-383, 401-408 
(gain-based remedies for breach of contract are briefly 
 17 
 
But there are also some obvious criticisms of gain-
based remedies in the context of breach of contract.  Law 
and economics analysts will not see the claim to another’s 
gain as economically efficient in this context, especially 
if the innocent party has in fact suffered no or relatively 
little loss or could easily obtain a substitute performance 
in the market place.
41
  Some have said that the contract-
breaker’s gain is merely a convenient way, or element, in 
measuring the innocent party’s loss in complex cases.42   
Within the Common Law, gain-based damages seem to extend 
remedies characteristic of fiduciary relationships – ones 
where parties are obliged to promote another’s interests 
ahead of their own – into the more arms-length relationship 
of ordinary contract law.  While this may be acceptable in 
cases like Blake (since it concerned the profits made by a 
traitor to his country through publication of his memoirs), 
it is much less so in many other, more common situations.  
If decisions like the Israeli Adras case begin to become 
usual under these rules, for example, there are 
implications for otherwise normal commercial activity which 
will greatly concern business interests.  As already noted, 
in the Blake case the House of Lords stressed that the new 
remedy was for exceptional cases; but "if the remedy is 
limited to exceptional cases, it will in effect become a 
matter of judicial discretion rather than genuinely rule-
based law, with all the consequential uncertainty for 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussed at 403-404); DCFR (above, note 8), vol 4, 4046-
4053. 
41
 Burrows, Restitution (above, note 32), 484-485; Edelman, 
Gain-based Damages (above, note 31), 163-164.  
42
 G H Treitel (E Peel, ed), The Law of Contract, 12th edn 
(Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell, London: 2007), 992-1000.  
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contracting parties."
 43
  Again, although English decisions 
applying Blake have only allowed its deployment where the 
breach was deliberate and aimed directly at the gain or 
saving,
44
 this approach also creates difficulties: "if it is 
essentially a remedy against cynical or intentional breach 
aimed at making the gain in question, there will have to be 
difficult inquiries into the motivations lying behind 
people’s conduct."45 
 
So what does the DCFR tell us in this debate?  What 
should be the European answer to the question?  Under the 
chapter heading “Remedies for Non-Performance [of an 
Obligation]”, there is a section headed “Damages and 
Interest”, and it is clear that damages are recoverable 
only in respect of loss suffered by the creditor in the 
obligation – the word “loss” being used several times in 
the five relevant articles.
46
  The definition of loss in the 
DCFR serves mainly to clarify that the concept covers both 
economic and non-economic loss, and shows that we are 
talking only about detriment to the creditor in the 
obligation, not any benefit that may have accrued to the 
debtor (the contract-breaker, in the language I have been 
using previously).
47
 The commentary to DCFR III.-3:701 
confirms what is apparent from the text:  
 
                                                 
43
 H MacQueen & J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland 2nd edn 
(Tottel Publishing, Edinburgh: 2007), para 6.17.  
44
 See above, text accompanying note 27.   
45
 MacQueen & Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (above, note 
43), para 6.17.  
46
 DCFR III.-3:701-705.  
47
 DCFR (above, note 8), vol 1, Definitions, 74.  
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A few of the laws [i.e. national laws] permit the 
creditor in particular circumstances to recover the 
gains made by the debtor through the non-performance, 
even if these exceed the loss to the creditor.  The 
situations are so limited that this approach has not 
been adopted in these rules.
48
   
 
So it would seem as though the DCFR is in the negative on 
gain-based remedies for breach of contract.  
 
But if we turn to the DCFR’s Book VII on unjustified 
enrichment, we find that, in line with the general European 
pattern already mentioned above,
49
 enrichment may be 
constituted by use of another’s assets,50 and “disadvantage” 
by another’s use of one’s assets51 – enrichment by taking or 
use or interference, in other words.  “Assets” means 
“anything of economic value” and is not confined to 
property rights.
52
  A right to receive performance due under 
a contract would appear to be such an asset.  This is also 
confirmed, it is suggested, by the DCFR's general 
definition of “Right”: 
 
“Right”, depending on the context, may mean (a) the 
correlative of an obligation or liability … (e) an 
entitlement to a particular remedy (as in a right to 
                                                 
48
 Commentary B, para 2.  
49
 See above, text accompanying note 40.   
50
 DCFR VII.-3:101.  
51
 DCFR VII.-3:102. 
52
 DCFR (above, note 8), vol 1, Definitions, 66; also ibid, 
vol 4, 4005. 
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have performance of a contractual obligation 
judicially ordered …). 
53
 
 
The gain from use of another person’s asset is 
“attributable to another’s disadvantage” i.e. constitutes 
unjustified and therefore reversible enrichment, 
“especially where the enriched person infringes the 
disadvantaged person’s rights”.54  Once more it seems clear 
that breach of a co-contractor's right to performance can 
fall within the scope of the rules. 
 
 The Commentary on the enrichment liability for use of 
another's asset states that the idea of "use"  
 
presupposes an intention to do the act which amounts 
to utilisation of the asset … [and] involves the 
limitation that the enriched party has in effect 
displaced another's (potential) enjoyment. … [F]urther 
… the act of interference with another's asset must be 
directed towards extracting utility from the subject-
matter.
55
 
 
Some link to the idea of deliberateness or cynicism on the 
part of the contract-breaker found in English law may be 
apparent here.  The inadvertent or merely negligent breaker 
of a contract who happens to profit as a result of the 
breach will not be liable to disgorge the gain.
56
 
 
                                                 
53
 DCFR (above, note 8), vol 1, Definitions, 79.  
54
 DCFR VII.-4:101(c).  
55
 DCFR (above, note 8), vol 4, 4012. 
56
 See further ibid, 4015.  
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Provided then that it is possible to switch from the 
law on non-performance of obligations under the DCFR, the 
way seems to be open for the innocent party in our scenario 
to recover the contract-breaker’s deliberate gain under the 
book on unjustified enrichment.  But is it possible to 
switch claims from contract to enrichment in this way?  The 
unjustified enrichment book has a chapter on its 
relationship to other legal rules.  These say that the book 
does not affect “any other right to recover arising under 
contractual or other rules of private law”.57  But if we 
have read the rules on damages correctly, they do not 
provide another right to recover.  So there is no problem 
here.   
 
DCFR VII.-7:101(1) says however that the unjustified 
enrichment book is affected where an enrichment is 
“obtained by virtue of a contract”, so that other rules 
will govern the legal consequences if these rules “grant or 
exclude a right to reversal of an enrichment”.58  But two 
points immediately arise: (1) our contract-breaker’s self-
enrichment is not obtained by virtue of a contract, but 
rather by going against the contract; (2) only if we read 
the rules on damages as impliedly excluding other forms of 
recovery are the enrichment rules rendered irrelevant, 
because there is nothing express to that effect in the 
relevant Articles, or indeed elsewhere in the Chapter on 
remedies for non-performance.  So it still seems open for 
the innocent contracting party to turn to unjustified 
                                                 
57
 DCFR VII.-7:101(3).  
58
 Note also DCFR VII.-2:101: “An enrichment is unjustified 
unless: (a) the enriched person is entitled as against the 
disadvantaged person to the enrichment by virtue of a 
contract …”.  
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enrichment as a basis for a claim against the contract-
breaker.  
 
Eric Clive, with whom I discussed this issue, drew my 
attention to DCFR VI.-6:101(4) in the Book on non-
contractual liability arising out of damage caused to 
another (delict or tort, in the terminology of Scots and 
English lawyers respectively).  The general position here 
is that damages are awarded for loss, to put the injured 
person in the position s/he would have been in had the 
legally relevant damage not occurred.  But DCFR VI.-
6:101(4) allows “as an alternative, but only where this is 
reasonable”, that 
 
reparation may take the form of recovery from the 
person accountable for the causation of the legally 
relevant damage of any advantage obtained by the 
latter in connection with causing the damage.
59
 
 
It may be added that nothing in the DCFR prevents a claim 
under Book VI between contracting parties, so long as the 
creditor has suffered “legally relevant damage”, that is to 
say, loss (economic or non-economic) or injury (i.e., the 
physical impact upon person or property of the creditor).  
This may be the tricky point if there is no economic loss 
flowing from the breach of contract (which I think by 
itself is not an injury within the meaning of Book VI).  
The national notes to this text show claims of this sort 
being allowed in the existing law of some jurisdictions on 
the basis that the loss to the innocent party can be best 
                                                 
59
 Emphasis supplied.  
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measured via the contract-breaker’s profit, while other 
countries simply allow a claim in unjustified enrichment.
60
  
So the exact scope of DCFR Article VI.-6:101(4) in relation 
to our scenario is not certain.  Given the exceptionalism 
emphasised in the English decisions, it is also troubling 
that the only limitation upon the choice of a gain-based 
remedy here is “reasonableness”.  But the express provision 
for gain-based damages in non-contractual liability 
probably confirms that the silence of the general 
obligations/contract provisions on this possibility 
signifies that such recovery is not within their scope. 
 
My overall sense at this stage is that the answer to 
my question about gain-based recovery for breach of 
contract is not clear on the face of the present DCFR text.  
We might be able to get a bit further with the general 
Article (DCFR I.-1:102) on Interpretation and Development 
of the DCFR.  Sub-paragraph (4) says that “Issues within 
the scope of the rules but not expressly settled by them 
are so far as possible to be settled in accordance with the 
principles underlying them”, since there is an underlying 
principle of justice recognised in relation to both 
contractual and non-contractual obligations by the DCFR: 
that people should not be allowed to gain an advantage from 
their own unlawful, dishonest or dishonest conduct.
61
  But 
given that the claim we are discussing is not widely 
recognised in the laws of Member States, and that it would 
therefore be rather important to know what the limits of 
such a claim might be if it is to be allowed at all, these 
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 DCFR (above, note 8), vol 4, 3736-3742.  
61
 DCFR Princ. paras 42, 48 (DCFR (aove, note 8), vol 1, 54, 
57).  
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general principles are a rather insecure basis for further 
development in this area.  
 
In general, then, this topic seems to be a good 
example of where the DCFR itself needs further exploration 
and, perhaps, elaboration before it can become a model, 
whether for a European Civil Code or legislative toolbox, 
or, less ambitiously, for adoption or inspiration in 
national laws of obligations.  The discussion needed will 
not be easy.  An approach based upon the idea that gain-
based recovery is somehow or other damages may lead to 
awkward questions about the application of such aspects of 
the general law of damages as causation, remoteness, 
contributory negligence and (perhaps) mitigation.
62
  Again, 
if the availability of specific performance is to offer 
some sort of guidance on when a gain-based remedy is 
appropriate, the DCFR entitles the creditor to such an 
order generally, rather than making it exceptional and 
subject to the discretion of the court as in England.
63
  One 
limitation upon the general availability of specific 
performance in the DCFR, however, drawn from English law, 
is where the "performance would be of such a personal 
character that it would be unreasonable to enforce it".
64
  
Burrows has questioned whether such bars to specific 
performance also apply to prevent recovery of gains in 
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 For these principles in the DCFR, see DCFR III.-3:701(1), 
703, 704 and 705.  See further on English law Edelman, 
Gain-based Damages (above, note 31), 103-111, 160-162, 171-
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English law.
65
  It is( certainly not obvious that this 
should be so.   
 
An approach through enrichment law will also face 
difficulties, given the general perception of a need to 
restrict cases of gain-based recovery (if not to exclude 
them altogether) in the context of breach of contract.
66
  
Whether the DCFR's requirement that the enriching use be 
intentional and displace the other contracting party's 
entitlement, or its principal enrichment defence of 
disenrichment (change of position by the enriched) are 
really sufficient brakes upon liability for cases of this 
kind is far from clear.
67
  Disenrichment would not have any 
obvious application in such commercial contract cases as 
Adras, for example.  The reasonableness limitation used to 
restrict gain-based recovery in the non-contractual 
liability Book also seems to allow claims too widely for 
the breach of contract case.  On the other hand, the 
pragmatic observation that claimants will only turn to the 
gain-based remedy in the rare cases where it gives more 
than the loss-based one or specific performance may well 
turn out to be the most effective limitation of all.   
 
Apart from Israel, the only guidance on our question 
offered by the traditional mixed systems is in the negative 
or by way of silence.  But where the guidance is negative, 
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 Burrows, Remedies (above, note 28), 399.  See further 
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 DCFR VII.-6:101.  
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it is guidance that was laid down in the nineteenth 
century; and it is a legitimate question whether that 
guidance remains appropriate in the twenty-first century.  
I should not be taken as affirming that the guidance is 
inappropriate – old law can be good law – but it is 
challenged by other systems, and so needs review.  The 
challenges are, however, not unequivocal about this 
development of the law; and comparative research, 
reflection and consultation are therefore needed to 
determine the configuration of any change to be made via 
the DCFR or otherwise.   
 
Let me turn finally to Africa.  In the light of what I 
have been saying about the DCFR as a model in Europe, it 
should be fairly obvious that a further possibility is its 
use as a model elsewhere.  There has indeed been interest 
in it outside Europe, especially, I believe, in Asia.  The 
very existence of the DCFR shows the wrongness of the 
Legrand view that such projects are impossible.
68
  In Africa 
the closest parallel already in existence is L'Organisation 
pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires 
(OHADA), which has created a uniform commercial law 
applying across 16 countries, mostly but not exclusively 
from the Francophone Civil law tradition.
69
  Since a general 
                                                 
68
 See e.g. Pierre Legrand, "Antivonbar", Journal of 
Comparative Law 1 (2006) 13.  
69
 See Boris Martor, Nanette Pilkington, David S Sellers and 
Sébastien Thouvenot, Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the 
Harmonisation Process 2nd edn (GMB Publishing, London and 
Philadelphia: 2007); Claire Moore Dickerson (ed), unified 
Business Laws for Africa: Common Law Perspectives on OHADA 
(GMB Publishing, London and Philadelphia: 2009); and the 
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law of contract is understood to be a current OHADA project 
using the UNIDROIT Principles as its starting point,
70
 the 
possibility of making use of the general contract articles 
of the DCFR must already be present; and there may be room 
to consider other areas not yet dealt with in OHADA, such 
as lease of moveables, services contracts, and franchising.  
The DCFR may also be helpful in the ongoing modernization 
of existing OHADA Uniform Acts in areas such as sale and 
securities. 
 
But is a “European” project which is basically about 
private rather than strictly commercial law the best model 
for post-colonial Africa?  Several issues arise.  What 
about the inclusion of customary law, a phenomenon for 
which contemporary Europe has little parallel, and which is 
certainly not recognised in any African sense of the phrase 
in the DCFR?
71
  In Europe, it is controversial how far the 
DCFR deals with social justice;
72
 this would be an even more 
important criticism in Africa.  I would however note that 
the DCFR is not the only game in Europe for the 
Europeanisation of law, and the rule-making approach need 
not be the only method for Africa should the pursuit of 
legal unity, or harmony, become a general policy objective 
for the continent.  Comparative law is the fundamental 
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basis for unification work, and it is a broad church 
embracing a variety of beliefs and approaches, even if the 
members of the church sometimes seem more interested in 
pursuing that which divides them than that which binds them 
together.  
 
What seems to me one of the key goals of comparative 
law historically and today is that of legal unity.  Time 
does not allow the detailed development of this 
observation, but it is certainly true that a theme of 
contemporary European comparative law is based upon the 
ideas that European legal systems are converging or 
convergent, that this is a good thing, and that it should 
be promoted through comparative work.  Various contrasting 
methods exist.  In some ways they reflect the distinct 
shapers of European law historically: the legislators, the 
professors and the judges.  The DCFR stands for the 
legislative approach.  But Reinhard Zimmermann argues that 
scholarship is the first step, showing by historical and 
comparative study the commonalities in European legal 
systems.  He points in the direction of an eventually 
unified law, but the ground needs thoroughly prepared and 
investigated first.  I think he believes that the DCFR goes 
too far too fast.
73
  Sir Basil Markesinis on the other hand 
rejects historical studies and focuses instead on making 
foreign law known to the higher judiciary for use in 
deciding cases in convergent ways.
74
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The problem with these approaches is that, if legal 
unity is seen to be important from a policy point of view, 
neither by itself provides a means of knowing when we have 
got there, or even somewhere near it.  Scholars notoriously 
disagree with each other (as the example of comparative law 
shows with particular intensity).  Judges are also rather 
unpredictable, and anyway their law-making role within 
legal systems varies enormously, even at the highest 
levels.  True legal unity may also be achieved only if the 
judges at the lowest rather than the highest levels of the 
court systems are deciding like cases broadly alike, and by 
reference to generally agreed common sources.  There is 
also the problem of deciding which foreign laws to use, if 
the judge’s own legal system will allow him or her to do so 
at all.
75
   
 
Uncertainty thus bedevils such non-legislative 
approaches; as also Jan Smits’ arguments that law should be 
left to Europeanise and find the best rule for that process 
through a process of natural selection and competition 
between legal systems.
76
  How do we know when we have the 
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fittest rule for today as we progress up the evolutionary 
chain?  The approach of the "Common Core of European 
Private Law" group based in Italy at least offers an 
empirical base of sorts, by investigating how different 
systems deal with particular hypothetical case studies, 
which may (but also may not) demonstrate that apparent 
doctrinal differences disguise a functional unity of 
outcome.
77
  Even the comparative study of mixed legal 
systems may be seen as a distinct way of finding out how 
unity may be achieved in the face of apparently divergent 
sources.
78
   
 
I think that all of these approaches can and do 
contribute to the achievement of legal unity, but none of 
them will do on their own, especially if time and certainty 
are seen as significant issues in the process.  The 
PECL/DCFR approach is an experiment in convergence through 
comparative rule-making by representative groups.  What it 
contributes, very importantly, is an attempt to formulate 
unified rules, and one that works on a systematic rather 
than an ad hoc or casuistic basis.  Its results exist in a 
form which can be used, not only by the legislator (at whom 
perhaps it is principally aimed), but also by the judges 
and the professors.  At least for the moment, it does not 
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promote a dull, monotonous uniformity, but instead adds to 
the colour and variety of the options on offer.   
 
I joined both the PECL and the DCFR projects a long 
time ago and I remain eager and willing to go on with this 
kind of work.  It is a grand experiment.  Is a European 
private law in the form of a civil code possible?  That 
question is not fully answered even yet, since crucial 
tracts of private law have not really been touched upon in 
the work to date.  But the DCFR goes a long way to show 
that the law of obligations can be Europeanised.  It is now 
a question of policy and substance whether to make it so.   
 
If African unity in private as well as commercial law 
is thought to be a potentially good idea, then it is up to 
scholars to begin to explore it, preferably by a variety of 
routes; but one of those possible routes should be the 
soft-law-drafting one, to see what if anything can be 
achieved that way at this stage in the development of 
Africa.  A way to start the latter, if time and resource 
will not allow the luxury of establishing study groups on 
all the topics that might be covered under the head of 
private law, might be systematic critical review from an 
African perspective of either the DCFR or, if that seems 
too much to swallow in one go, PECL (as revised in DCFR).  
The resource is a rich one, and it is waiting to be 
exploited.  
